NickPapagiorgio

As I said, I don't want to come off as negative and I will give them the benefit of the doubt but coming off the SB, with the epected hangover and losing Strahan (unless he comes back) and Osi (not to mention a few other defensive players) I would not be surprised if they missed the playoffs in what should be a very competive NFC East.

I also think they are going to miss Shockey. I know he wasn't there at the end of the year and I know why they traded him, and I don't blame them, I just think they may miss his talents out on the field.

__________________
NickPapagiorgio Posting Alert System (current status): Green

Fonzy13

Are you an Eagles fan as well?

__________________
We
Are
****ed! (WAF)

The WAF Pledge of Allegiance

Under water grottos, caverns


Filled with apes


That eat figs.


Stepping on the figs


That the apes


Eat, they crunch.


The apes howl, bare


Their fangs, dance . .

Yes. We. Do.

dak11

Today should be a big day in the Strahan saga. Seems he has a court hearing today that will determine how much, if any, more money he might owe his ex-wife. Could be up to another 6.5 mil on top of the 15 mil she already got awarded.

Giants Blog

On Tuesday, a New Jersey state appeals court is expected to rule whether Strahan has to pay a $15.3 million award to his ex-wife, Jean Strahan. Strahan has already paid half the award and says Jean is not entitled to $6.5 million from a pre-nuptial agreement. The ruling on that case could be a factor in determining if Strahan is willing to take the Giants money in exchange for a comeback.

metman

If the other guys step up, they can overcome it. That said, this is a brutal brutal blow to a team. They just have to suck it up and tough it out.

__________________
SHUT Your FESTERING GOB...You TIT!

Big Denny

And here is a text on the Court's decision for all who are interested.

__________________________________________________ ______________
Argued April 9, 2008 – Decided
Before Judges Parker, R. B. Coleman and
Lyons.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
Essex County, Docket No. FM-07-1858-05.
Angelo Genova argued the cause for appellant
(Genova, Burns & Vernoia, Pashman Stein,
P.C., and Walder, Hayden and Brogan,
attorneys; Michael S. Stein and Sean Mack,
on the brief).
Ellen C. Marshall argued the cause for
respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, J.A.D.
Plaintiff Michael Strahan appeals from an amended judgment
of divorce entered on January 12, 2007 and an order entered on
March 22, 2007 denying his motion for reconsideration.
August 26, 2008
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
August 26, 2008
APPELLATE DIVISION
2 A-3747-06T4
Plaintiff is a football player who has been under contract
with the New York Giants since 1993. He began dating defendant
in October 1994. At the time they met, defendant was employed
as a model and manager for a cosmetics company, earning about
$70,000 per year. In 1995, the parties moved in together and
defendant quit her job, purportedly at plaintiff's request.
When plaintiff extended a marriage proposal, defendant agreed to
sign a pre-nuptial agreement (agreement) before they married on
July 18, 1999. Twin girls were born of the marriage on October
28, 2004.
The complaint for divorce was filed on March 14, 2005. The
parties were able to agree on joint legal custody of the
children with defendant having primary residential custody. The
matter was tried over eleven days in June and July 2006. A dual
judgment of divorce was entered on July 20, 2006 dissolving the
marriage. An amended judgment was entered on January 12, 2007
addressing the validity of the agreement, equitable
distribution, child support, disability insurance for plaintiff
and counsel fees.
In this appeal, plaintiff argues that (1) he performed his
obligations under the agreement and the equitable distribution
of the parties' joint assets exceeded the amount to which
defendant was entitled under the agreement; (2) the trial court
3 A-3747-06T4
erred in its calculation of child support and failed to make the
necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law in awarding
child support; (3) the trial court erred in requiring plaintiff
to pay ninety-one percent of the total child support; (4) the
trial court erred in ordering plaintiff to obtain a $7.5 million
disability insurance policy; and (5) the trial court erred in
awarding $13,777.50 in counsel and accountant fees to defendant.
During the pendency of this appeal, the parties reached an
agreement and entered a partial stipulation dismissing the
equitable distribution issues, leaving only child support, the
disability insurance and counsel fees to be addressed by this
court. On July 11, 2008 an order was entered memorializing the
stipulation and allowing the parties to distribute the monies
held in the court's trust fund escrow account. Accordingly, we
will address only the remaining issues of (a) child support; (b)
the disability insurance policy; and (c) counsel fees.
A. Child Support
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in setting
the amount of supplemental child support and in ordering him to
pay 91% of the amount.
Both parents have a shared obligation to support their
children. Koelble v. Koelble, 261 N.J. Super. 190, 194 (App.
Div. 1992). "[W]here the parties have the financial wherewithal
4 A-3747-06T4
to provide for their children, the children are entitled to the
benefit of financial advantages available to them." Isaacson v.
Isaacson, 348 N.J. Super. 560, 579 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
174 N.J. 364 (2002). "Children are entitled to not only bare
necessities, but a supporting parent has the obligation to share
with his children the benefit of his financial achievement."
Id. at 580.
In setting child support, the court shall consider the
factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a):
(1) Needs of the child;
(2) Standard of living and economic
circumstances of each parent;
(3) All sources of income and assets of
each parent;
(4) Earning ability of each parent,
including educational background, training,
employment skills, work experience,
custodial responsibility for children
including the cost of providing child care
and the length of time and cost of each
parent to obtain training or experience for
appropriate employment;
(5) Need and capacity of the child for
education, including higher education;
(6) Age and health of the child and each
parent;
(7) Income, assets and earning ability of
the child;
(8) Responsibility of the parents for the
court-ordered support of others;
5 A-3747-06T4
(9) Reasonable debts and liabilities of
each child and parent; and
(10) Any other factors the court may deem
relevant.
"If the combined net income of the parents is more than
$187,200 per year, the court shall apply the guidelines up to
$187,200 and supplement the guidelines-based award with a
discretionary amount based on the remaining family income (i.e.,
income in excess of $187,200) and the factors specified in
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23." Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules,
Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at 2302 (2007). "The key to both the
[g]uidelines and the statutory factors is flexibility and the
best interest of children." Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583,
594 (1995).
In the context of high-income parents whose ability to pay
is not an issue, "the dominant guideline for consideration is
the reasonable needs of the children, which must be addressed in
the context of the standard of living of the parties. The needs
of the children must be the centerpiece of any relevant
analysis." Isaacson, supra, 348 N.J. Super. at 581 (emphasis
added). The consideration of needs must include the age and
health of the children -- with the understanding that infants'
needs are less than those of teenagers -- as well as any assets
or income of the children. Ibid.
6 A-3747-06T4
Determining a child's "needs" in high-income earning
families presents "unique problems." Id. at 582.
First, a balance must be struck between
reasonable needs, which reflect lifestyle
opportunities, while at the same time
precluding an inappropriate windfall to the
child or even in some cases infringing on
the legitimate right of either parent to
determine the appropriate lifestyle of a
child. This latter consideration involves a
careful balancing of interests reflecting
that a child's entitlement to share in a
parent's good fortune does not deprive
either parent of the right to participate in
the development of an appropriate value
system for a child. This is a critical
tension that may develop between competing
parents. Ultimately, the needs of a child
in such circumstances also calls to the fore
the best interests of a child.
[Ibid. (citation omitted).]
"

__________________
"I'll say it again in the land of the free ,use your freedom of choice".

DEVO

Big Denny

Continued.

Judges must be vigilant in providing for 'needs'
consistent with lifestyle without overindulgence." Id. at 583.
In Isaacson, we referred to the Kansas "Three Pony Rule," which
states that "'no child, no matter how wealthy the parents, needs
to be provided [with] more than three ponies.'" Ibid. (quoting
In re Patterson, 920 P.2d 450, 455 (Kan. App. 1996)). Even with
high income parents, the court still must "determin[e] needs of
a child in a sensible manner consistent with the best interests
of the child." Isaacson, supra, 348 N.J. Super. at 584. "[T]he
law is not offended if there is some incidental benefit to the
custodial parent from increased child support payments." Ibid.
7 A-3747-06T4
While "some incidental benefit" is not offensive, "overreaching
in the name of benefiting a child is." Id. at 585. "[A]
custodial parent cannot[,] through the guise of the incidental
benefits of child support[,] gain a benefit beyond that which is
merely incidental to a benefit being conferred on the child."
Loro v. Del Colliano, 354 N.J. Super. 212, 225-26 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 174 N.J. 544 (2002). That is especially true
where the custodial parent is not entitled to alimony. Ibid.
"The award of nonessential additions to child support requires a
careful weighing and determination as to who is the primary and
who is the incidental beneficiary of such support." Ibid.
Here, the parties' experts agreed the marital standard of
living was approximately $1 million a year. The court found
that the "reasonable current standard of living" of defendant
and the two children was $630,000 a year. The court set forth
all of the expenses that went into that figure, but did not
distinguish defendant's expenses from those of the children's.
The court stated that defendant "reported spending approximately
$8,000 per month over an approximate twelve month period on the
children." The court added: "The historical expenses
attributed to the children, to the extent reasonable and
recurring, have been reviewed and weighed to their current needs
as determined by the court's analysis of the factors under
8 A-3747-06T4
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)." The basic child support amount under the
guidelines was $35,984 a year. But, the court found that the
children had a supplemental need of $200,000 a year, for a total
of $235,984 a year.
The court did not impute income to defendant but considered
the funds she would have available at the conclusion of the
divorce. The court determined defendant would have $10.5
million in liquid assets to invest, which would return about
$525,600 annually in gross income or $341,640 net, or $28,470
net income per month. With monthly expenses of $52,500,
however, defendant had a shortfall of $24,030 per month.
Plaintiff's post-divorce income for 2006 was about $5.87
million, with "$292,000 net monthly income available for child
support." The parties' combined net monthly income was
$330,470, with plaintiff's income being 91% of the total and
defendant's 9%. Plaintiff's 91% share of the annual child
support amounted to $214,745. This did not include the
additional expenses for the children that plaintiff volunteered
to pay: medical insurance, uncovered medical expenses, and 80%
of the agreed-upon extra-curricular activities and college
expenses.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court's decision was
defective because it was "completely bereft of any correlation
9 A-3747-06T4
between the relevant facts and the law," and gave no explanation
as to how the court arrived at the $200,000 supplemental award.
Specifically, plaintiff argues that the court (1) failed to make
findings concerning the reasonable needs of the children, (2)
failed to explain its balancing of the reasonable needs of the
children and plaintiff's right to have a say in how his children
are raised, (3) failed to identify non-essential items in
defendant's statement of the children's needs; and (4) failed to
determine who was the primary beneficiary of the award.
Plaintiff maintains that the award was a windfall to defendant,
and that the judge erred in failing to impute any income to her.
"Meaningful appellate review is inhibited unless the judge
sets forth the reasons for his or her opinion." Salch v. Salch,
240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990). "The absence of
adequate findings . . . necessitates a reversal." Heinl v.
Heinl, 287 N.J. Super. 337, 347 (App. Div. 1996). We ordinarily
remand to the trial court to make findings of fact if the trial
court failed to do so. Barnett and Herenchak, Inc. v. State
Dep't of Transp., 276 N.J. Super. 465, 473 (App. Div. 1994).
We agree with plaintiff that the court here failed to make
the specific findings of fact necessary to sustain its decision
regarding the amount of supplemental child support. The court
merely repeated defendant's recitation of the children's "needs"
10 A-3747-06T4
as they appeared on her case information statement (CIS) without
any determination of what was essential or non-essential or any
judgment regarding the accuracy or appropriateness of those
needs. Expenses such as the mortgage, taxes, utilities, car
expenses, and similar items benefited defendant as well as the
children, but the court did not discuss what portion of those
expenses was for the benefit of the children and what portion
was for the benefit of defendant.
Defendant broke down some of these expenses on her CIS,
attributing between one-half to two-thirds of the expenses to
the children. Plaintiff's accounting expert testified, that in
such cases, it is customary to attribute twenty-percent of such
joint expenses to the children. While the law is not offended
if defendant receives an incidental benefit, the custodial
parent cannot be a primary beneficiary. Loro, supra, 354 N.J.
Super. at 224-25. This is of special concern when, as here, the
custodial parent has no right to alimony. Id. at 226. The
trial court failed to address this very significant issue.
Moreover, the court failed to make any analysis of the
reasonableness of the "needs" claimed by defendant on behalf of
the twin toddlers. Although in high income families, children
are entitled to the benefit of financial advantages available to
them, "the custodial parent bears the burden of establishing the
11 A-3747-06T4
reasonableness of those expenses." Accardi v. Accardi, 369 N.J.
Super. 75, 88 (App. Div. 2004). Some of the expenses claimed
by defendant clearly should have been deleted by the court. For
example, the "children" sent their nanny and her family to
Jamaica for a ten-day vacation, and gave their grandmother
diamond jewelry. Defendant claimed that the twin toddlers
needed nearly $27,000 a year for clothing because she dressed
them in a new outfit every time they saw their father, and one
of the three-year-old girls did not like to leave the house
without a purse. There was no explanation as to why the
children needed $30,000 worth of landscaping per year, or what
was included in $3,000 for "audio visual" expenses per year.
Defendant listed $36,000 a year for the children's "equipment
and furnishings" without explaining what that covered. Other
expenses listed in defendant's CIS should have been questioned
by the court, as well, but the court made no distinction between
what needs were reasonable, given the young age of the children,
and what simply amounted to a "fourth pony." Nor is it possible
to tell from the record whether the court "double-counted"
certain expenses that appear on defendant's CIS, such as
unreimbursed medical expenses, that plaintiff volunteered to pay
separately.
12 A-3747-06T4
The court failed to acknowledge that because the twins were
only a few months old when the parties' separated, there was
virtually no "marital standard" to ascertain the way the
parties' treated the children. Defendant admitted that many of
the expenses she listed for the children were incurred without
plaintiff's knowledge or consent. At trial, plaintiff expressed
his desire not "to spoil" the children and to teach them the
value of money. Nevertheless, the court failed to address
plaintiff's "legitimate right . . . to determine the appropriate
lifestyle of [his] child[ren]." Isaacson, supra, 348 N.J.
Super. at 582.

__________________
"I'll say it again in the land of the free ,use your freedom of choice".

DEVO

Big Denny

continued.

Plaintiff further argues that the judge erred in failing to
impute any income to defendant for child support purposes. He
maintains that defendant has two college degrees, had earned
$70,000 per year prior to the marriage, and admitted that she
was capable of working but chose not to do so. He contends that
her "voluntary decision to be unemployed is not a legitimate
basis for failing to impute any income." We agree.
The "fairness of a child support award is dependent on the
accurate determination of a parent's net income. If the court
finds that either parent is, without just cause, voluntarily
underemployed or unemployed, it shall impute income to that
parent[.]" Pressler, supra, Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at 2292.
13 A-3747-06T4
In Caplan v. Caplan, 182 N.J. 250, 268 (2005), the Court
concluded "that the imputation of income to one or both parents
who have voluntarily remained underemployed or unemployed,
without just cause, will promote a fair and just allocation of
the child support responsibility of the parents." In assessing
income, however, the court must first determine whether the
parent has "just cause" to be voluntarily unemployed. Ibid.
"In making that decision, the court should consider the
employment status and earning capacity of that parent had the
family remained intact; the reason for and intent behind the
voluntary underemployment or unemployment; the extent other
assets are available to pay support; and the ages of the
children in the parent's household as well as child-care
alternatives." Ibid.; see also Pressler, supra, Appendix IX-A
at 2293.
If the court finds that there is no "just cause" for the
parent remaining unemployed or underemployed, the guidelines
provide that income can be imputed "based on potential
employment and earning capacity using the parent's work history,
occupational qualifications, educational background and . . .
job opportunities." Pressler, supra, Appendix IX-A at 2292.
The court also may impute income in accordance with the person's
usual or former occupation. Ibid.
14 A-3747-06T4
Here, the court concluded that defendant was "neither
voluntarily unemployed nor underemployed" and declined to impute
income to her. The court explained:
The defendant was a wife, homemaker,
companion, and mother during her
relationship with the plaintiff. The
plaintiff did not want the defendant to be
employed during their cohabitation, both
before and after their marriage. The court
finds the plaintiff wanted the defendant to
be his companion and wife, and ultimately,
the full time mother of his children. The
parties' relationship was a "shared
enterprise" resulting in their living
together, becoming engaged and married, and
wanting to have children. On the parties'
tax returns the plaintiff reported
. . . [defendant's occupation] as homemaker.
. . . The parties' parenting agreement
recognized the defendant's parental
responsibilities as the primary caretaker of
the parties' children. . . . Under the
circumstances of this case, the defendant
cannot go back in time and continue her
employment or develop her career as if it
was 1994, the date of cohabitation, or 1999,
the date the parties married, or 2004, the
date the parties' twin[s] were born. The
defendant testified that she will not seek
employment but will raise the parties'
children as the parties' intended during her
pregnancy and after the birth of the
children. Under those circumstances, and
based on the assets and income of the
parties and quality of life for the
children, the court finds it would be
unreasonable to impute earned employment
income to the defendant.
First, we note that the parties separated when the children
were a few months old, so there was virtually no history of
15 A-3747-06T4
their conduct vis-à-vis the children. Second, defendant's
employment opportunities were, in all likelihood, enhanced by
her celebrity marriage. There is no question that as a healthy,
educated, forty-one-year old, defendant is capable of earning
her own income. The court found, however, that defendant was
unemployed at plaintiff's request, and had the family stayed
together, she would have remained unemployed. There is
insufficient evidence to support that conclusion, however. The
children were quite young when the parties separated and have
had nannies to care for them since they were born.
Although the court did attribute income to defendant from
the interest on her investments, it failed to take into
consideration the very substantial assets defendant derived from
the marriage and divorce, the opportunities for employment
available to her as the former wife of a celebrity and the time
available to her as a result of the nannies who care for the
children. In short, in the remand hearing, the court should
consider all possible sources of income for defendant -- earned
and unearned -- as well as her assets in determining her share
of child support.
Accordingly, we reverse the child support award of $235,984
per year -- 91% of which was charged to plaintiff -- and remand
for the trial court to reconsider in accordance with this
16 A-3747-06T4
opinion. We further direct the trial court to reconsider the
imputation of income to defendant and the percentage of child
support plaintiff is obligated to pay.
B. Disability Insurance
Plaintiff argues that the judge erred in requiring him to
maintain a $7.5 million disability policy, and in denying his
motion for reconsideration of the issue when he advised the
court that it was impossible to obtain such a policy. Defendant
maintains that the disability requirement was properly imposed
as a security for child support.
In its decision, the trial court stated:
The plaintiff reported in his
certificate of insurance coverage that he
maintains no disability coverage for total
disability from injury or sickness.
However, the plaintiff's contract with the
New York Giants required him from 2002
through 2004 to obtain (a) term life
insurance policies . . . and (b) a permanent
and total disability policy or policies
covering injury or death. Neither party
provided any evidence of disability
insurance to offset any loss of earned
income that may occur due to injury or
sickness. As further security for payment
of his child support obligation, the
plaintiff shall be required to obtain
disability insurance in the face amount of
$7,500,000 for "permanent total disability"
to offset any loss of income of [sic] earned
income that may occur due to injury or
sickness.
17 A-3747-06T4
In his motion for reconsideration, plaintiff certified that
he attempted to obtain a $7.5 million disability policy and was
unable to do so based on his age and his prior injuries. He
included a letter from an underwriter at HCC Specialty
Underwriters, Inc, stating the same. The court denied
plaintiff's reconsideration motion, simply stating that it was
permitted to require security to protect child support.
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.
Plaintiff argues that he should not have to maintain the
disability insurance because there was no evidence at trial to
support the requirement of the insurance or the amount. He
further argues that the court failed to make factual findings to
support its decision.
In addition to requiring plaintiff to obtain a $7.5 million
disability policy, the court ordered plaintiff to maintain a $4
million life insurance policy "as reasonable and equitable
security for [the children's] support and anticipated costs of
higher education if the plaintiff should prematurely expire."
It is illogical to require plaintiff to secure child support
with a $4 million policy in the event he dies, but require $7.5
million in disability insurance if he were injured and precluded
from playing football. If plaintiff were injured and unable to
play football, he would be no different than any other parent
18 A-3747-06T4
who is injured or ill and unable to pursue his or her chosen
profession. In such circumstances, the disabled parent would be
entitled to seek a modification of child support based upon the
reduction in income. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1990).
Moreover, plaintiff demonstrated that he cannot obtain
disability insurance. The trial court commented that plaintiff
should have addressed this issue at trial rather than in his
motion for reconsideration. While raising the issue at trial
would have allowed the parties to explore the issue to a greater
extent, plaintiff's failure to raise it at trial does not
preclude him from challenging the reasonableness of the court's
requirement after it was imposed. In our view, there is
insufficient evidence in the record to support the requirement
of a $7.5 million disability insurance policy and, given the $4
million life insurance requirement, it is not reasonable.
We do not operate in a vacuum and we are aware that while
this matter was pending, plaintiff announced that he was
retiring from professional football. Plaintiff's retirement
further illustrates the unreasonable requirement of the
disability policy: since there was no provision in the amended
judgment for securing child support when plaintiff retired, he
will have to address the issue of child support as any other
parent whose circumstances have changed. Lepis, supra, 83 N.J.
19 A-3747-06T4
at 146. If a trial court intends to secure child support
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, it must do so in a reasonable
manner.

__________________
"I'll say it again in the land of the free ,use your freedom of choice".

DEVO

Big Denny

finally.

The disability insurance issue is now moot in this case.
Accordingly, we vacate the paragraph on pages four and five of
the amended judgment requiring plaintiff to "maintain disability
insurance in the face amount of $7,500,000 for permanent total
disability to offset any loss of the plaintiff's professional
football earned income that may occur due to injury or
sickness."
C. Counsel Fees
Plaintiff contends that because the parties agreed that
each would pay his and her own counsel fees, the court erred by
awarding defendant a total of $13,777.50 in counsel and
accountant's fees as a result of the post-judgment motion for
reconsideration. Plaintiff further argues that even if fees
were permitted under the agreement, the judge erred in ordering
plaintiff to pay defendant's fees.
After the amended judgment was entered, plaintiff moved for
reconsideration and a stay of the order requiring him to pay
more than $6.5 million to defendant under the terms of the prenuptial
agreement. Defendant cross-moved for an order
adjudicating plaintiff in violation of litigant's rights for
20 A-3747-06T4
failing to pay $7.7 million due under the final judgment of
divorce, and for counsel fees.
Pursuant to Rule 5:3-5(c), a court may, in its discretion,
award counsel fees in a matrimonial action:
In determining the amount of the fee award,
the court should consider, in addition to
the information required to be submitted
pursuant to R. 4:42-9, the following
factors: (1) the financial circumstances of
the parties; (2) the ability of the parties
to pay their own fees or to contribute to
the fees of the other party; (3) the
reasonableness and good faith of the
positions advanced by the parties; (4) the
extent of the fees incurred by both parties;
(5) any fees previously awarded; (6) the
amount of fees previously paid to counsel by
each party; (7) the results obtained; (8)
the degree to which fees were incurred to
enforce existing orders or to compel
discovery; and (9) any other factor bearing
on the fairness of an award.
In this case, however, the parties' agreement stated:
In the event of an action for legal
separation or dissolution, each party shall
pay and be responsible for their own
respective attorney's fees and costs both
pending the litigation and upon completion
of the actions. If either party is called
upon to pay attorneys' fees or costs of the
other party, the amount paid shall be
charged against the Separate Property of the
party whose fees were paid and will be
reimbursed to the paying party.
[Emphasis added.]
In considering defendant's request for counsel fees, the
court stated:
21 A-3747-06T4
[Plaintiff] in effect, by seeking the
stay . . . would have the defendant use her
[principal] reducing her investment income
as indicated in her reply cross motion with
the information with regard to her
investment, and how it would be reduced, to
pay her attorney's fees, such would result
again in irreparable financial hardship to
this defendant, as indicated under the
[c]ourt's rulings as to her obligation as to
her financial circumstances, and her
obligation to pay her fair share of
maintaining her two children as the parent
of primary residence.

The court then concluded that plaintiff made the
reconsideration motion in bad faith, warranting an award of
counsel fees to defendant. When reminded by plaintiff's counsel
of the parties' pre-nuptial agreement regarding counsel fees,
the court stated: "I don't believe that it applies to a postaward
matter." In a supplemental order dated March 22, 2007,
the court ordered plaintiff to pay defendant accounting fees and
counsel fees totaling $13,777.50.
We will disturb a trial court's determination on counsel
fees only on the "rarest occasion," and then only because of
clear abuse of discretion. Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292,
317 (1995). We find that the court did, indeed, abuse its
discretion. In our view, the language in the pre-nuptial
agreement -- "both pending and upon completion of the actions"
-- includes motions for reconsideration. The amended final
judgment is not "final" in the sense that it cannot be enforced
22 A-3747-06T4
while the matter is still under reconsideration or stayed
pending appeal.
Plaintiff further argues that even if the agreement did not
preclude the award of fees, the court improperly assessed fees
against him. He maintains that his motion was not in bad faith
as evidenced by our grant of a stay pending appeal. We agree.
Our decision here further supports plaintiff's argument that his
motion for reconsideration was made in good faith.
Accordingly, we reverse and vacate paragraphs eleven and
twelve of the order entered on March 22, 2007 directing
plaintiff to pay defendant's accountant and counsel fees
totaling $13,777.50.
D. Remand to a Different Judge
In his final argument, plaintiff requests a remand to a
different judge based upon the trial judge's bias. We have
carefully considered the extensive record in this matter and
find no evidence of bias. Bias cannot be inferred from adverse
rulings against a party. Matthews v. Deane, 196 N.J. Super.
441, 444-47 (Ch. Div. 1984). We find no reason to remand the
matter to a different judge. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
To summarize our decision: (1) the paragraph in the
amended judgment directing plaintiff to pay "child support in
the sum of $214,745 annually, payable $8,948 on the first and
23 $8,948 on the fifteenth of each month" is reversed and remanded
for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion; (2) the
paragraph requiring plaintiff to maintain a $7.5 million
disability insurance policy is vacated; and (3) paragraphs
eleven and twelve of the March 22, 2007 order relating to
accountant and counsel fees are vacated.
Reversed in part; remanded in part.

__________________
"I'll say it again in the land of the free ,use your freedom of choice".

DEVO