Popular media wins over real troop needs yet again

[Mule]

Actually a continuation of the "Our troops need more armor on their HUMVEEs" debacle.

In January, my team traded out our well-worn M1114 Up-armored HMMWV for a 4X4 JERRV, one of the models of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles purchased by the Marine Corps. We were pretty excited to have the new vehicle, especially after our first look inside. I mean, the thing looks like the Cadillac Escalade of tactical vehicles. The IED threat in our little slice of Al Anbar had long since dropped to non-existent, but it felt good to have something that was specifically engineered to combat the threat, you know? It didn't take long for the novelty to wear off, however, and by the end of the deployment we had taken to operating mainly from a Humvee again. The MRAP is a superb EOD and convoy security vehicle (the acronym JERRV stands for Joint EOD Rapid Response Vehicle), but it is merely a passable utility and/or fighting vehicle. The thing was obviously designed with the EOD mission in mind, and if any operator input was incorporated into the design, it clearly did not come from the infantry community.

...

Because we frequently live and fight from our vehicle, we have to carry an assortment of odds and ends for our radios, weapons, and ourselves. Things like water, MREs, ammunition, spare barrels for the machinegun, and spare items for the radios. The jostling that I just mentioned makes it nearly impossible to store any of these items in the interior of the vehicle without significant modification. We tried removing one of the seats and putting in a wooden box with space for some of these items, but many items were tossed completely out of the box and ended up strewn about the floor of the vehicle. There is a complete lack of weapons stowage for passengers in the rear of the vehicle, and the weapons racks for the driver and VC are designed for M16s, not M4s. One aspect that seems to elude many tactical vehicle designers is that motorized infantry typically store their sustainment load (i.e. rucksacks) externally (see below). This allows the vehicle's internal space to be utilized for items that I mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, which must be readily accessible throughout the day. Sustainment items can typically wait until a long halt of some sort before they are needed. Yet, the MRAP has no provision for strapping a rucksack to the outside of the vehicle.

The MRAP is a vehicle that is well-suited for a particular niche, but due to pressure from people such as our lawmakers in Congress, it has been pressed into service in roles that it is not suited for. For a unit that never leaves a paved surface, and rarely spends more than 24 hours outside of some sort of operating base at a time, the MRAP's protection and communications capabilities make it a superb asset. For units that must remain expeditionary, be able to operate in a wide variety of terrain and pursue the enemy wherever he is found, the MRAP is ultimately a poor choice, and I in retrospect I am very glad that Gen Conway is reducing the number of these vehicles on order. Personally, if given the choice, I would take an M1114 or M1152 HMMWV over the JERRV 4X4, and would seek other means to reduce the IED threat through such things as tribal leader engagement and refining mounted patrol TTPs.

TTP = tactics techniques & procedures

Once again, we have the media and popular opinion telling Soldiers and Marines what their "best protection" is and then forcing more expensive, ill suited equipment down on top of them. These things are 3 times the cost of an uparmored Humvee and not nearly as well suited to the task at hand.

Kudos to Commandant Conway for nipping this particular instance in the bud as soon as he could, and weathering the storm of "you're undermining the protection of our troops" that's sure to come.

[RkFast]

Im with you, Mule....but the practice of outfitting the military with poor, misfitting and substandard weaponry and equipment due to politics and other behind the scenes BS goes back to 1776.

[Mule]

When you sign up, there's no promises made they're going to make you bulletproof. One of the first things you learn when you become an NCO in a combat unit is that mission accomplishment > troop welfare. This particular problem, I think we're addressing this properly, which is mostly through a shift in tactics.

I understand the military procurement process is an albatross, but you don't make it work better by weighing it down even farther.